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A ‘New’ View of Knowledge

In this short blog, I want to put forward, in a relatively new way, a view of knowledge that I think challenges the idea of standardised testing, the idea that is the horror of compulsory schooling, and the idea that our most precious resource – our children – should be compelled to be propagandised wards of the so-called State. My agenda is a compilation of ideas that I believe are quite specific. In this blog the specific idea I want to get across is that knowledge is nothing more than sociocultural memory recalled situationally. The key points are that it is personal knowledge, and no-one else’s. It cannot exist outside us. It is uniquely personal knowledge, and is tinged by the sociocultural context in which one experiences life. It emerges according to the demands of the situation in which one becomes conscious of something that draws on one’s sociocultural memory, and evanesces like a clearing mist, as one becomes conscious of something else. In short, your sociocultural memory is your knowledge…the knowledge of everything you experience, whether firsthand or not. Some (and here I hazard a guess) 98% of what you think you know, is, in fact, belief rather than knowledge.

I want to re-assert the point that knowledge does not exist outside the mind. It is not found in books – sound-shapes are. It does not reside in libraries – sound-shapes do. It cannot be traded or transmitted – sound-shapes can. It cannot be objectified because it has no existence…in the sense of ‘being’ outside us. It has five quite clear and demonstrable characteristics, including that of being entirely situational. Every one of the characteristics points to a specific relationship between oneself and one’s knowledge.

The five characteristics of knowledge are that it is:

  1. internal,
  2. personal,
  3. unique,
  4. situational, and
  5. evanescent.

Assuming the tabula rasa arguments of such giants as Aristotle, the Stoics, the Persian philosopher Ibn Sina, the Andalusian philosopher Ibn Tufail, and John Locke, it may be argued that the accumulation of experience in one’s sociocultural environment enables one, over time, to construct both predictions and expectations of life. The accumulation of sociocultural memory is, by definition, an internal phenomenon because the evolution of one’s sociocultural memory takes place inside one’s mind.

That knowledge is personal is arguable because one’s sociocultural experience is unique. The meaning constructed by someone in a relevant sociocultural context and situation is personally constructed from personal experience. Thus, one’s sociocultural memory – which is to say, one’s knowledge – is personal.

Because no two people experience life identically, it is arguable that one’s sociocultural experiences add up uniquely to become one’s sociocultural memory – which is to say, one’s knowledge…the thing one draws on when the situation calls forth that part of the sociocultural memory relevant to a particular situation.

Thus far, I have stated that knowledge, which I claim is nothing more than one’s sociocultural memory, is internal, personal and unique. No two people construct the same sociocultural memory and therefore no two people have the same knowledge. One implication of this relates to the question of standardised testing. Nothing is standardised about one’s internal, personal and unique sociocultural memory. So, what is standardised testing actually testing?

Next, one’s sociocultural memory is stored inside one’s being. It cannot emerge all at once. It is impossible to relate one’s entire sociocultural experience in a single idea or sound-shape. Rather, like a mist that unfolds when the environmental conditions are ‘right’, one’s sociocultural memory of frogs emerges when one becomes conscious of the idea of a frog…whatever that is in one’s experience. According to the situation, the relevant part of one’s sociocultural memory emerges as one’s knowledge of frogs…or Formula One, or anything else of which one becomes conscious momentarily. Consciousness flits typically from idea to idea, from thing to thing, from moment to moment, according to how we relate to our environment from moment to moment.

Becoming conscious momentarily is key to understanding the emergent and situational nature of one’s sociocultural memory, which is to say, one’s knowledge. But one’s knowledge or sociocultural memory does not remain in one’s consciousness forever. Like the mist that unfolds when the environmental conditions are ‘right’, when the environmental conditions change…when one conscious idea is replaced by another conscious idea…one’s sociocultural memory goes back into the ‘drawer’ from which it emerged, to be held in memory until called on again. This idea is described by the use of the sound-shape ‘evanescent’.

I argue that one’s sociocultural memory, one’s knowledge, is evanescent. It emerges situationally then reverts to its pre-emergent condition (whatever and wherever that is)…that is, it evanesces…once one becomes conscious of something else. One’s sociocultural memory is not lost (although it can be because of damage or trauma, for example). It is available. We are simply no longer aware of it because our attention has moved to something else. Under-use of one’s sociocultural memory appears to lead to its fading and eventual loss (forgotten).

In sum, therefore, I have argued that we can think of knowledge as internal, personal, unique, situational and evanescent. If we add the idea that knowledge derives from firsthand experience, the about 98% (a mere guess) of what we think we know is no more than faith-based belief in the credibility of others. None of us ‘knows’ that light takes about eight minutes to travel to earth from the sun. None of us has travelled the distance and proven by firsthand experience that this is a fact. We all believe it because we choose to take on faith the credibility of a scientist who tells us it is so.

This view of knowledge, I think, challenges the idea of standardised testing. Standardised testing tests one’s ability to recall someone else’s sequence of sound-shapes. It does not always test one’s knowledge, one’s sociocultural memory, constructed from primary experience. The standard is not reflective of an individual’s sociocultural memory but rather that of the tester (by which I mean typically the so-called State, which, arguably, uses testing to stratify society and to condemn those who do not ‘fit’ the bell curve, just so, to a life of doubt and uncertainty).

Compulsory schooling is nothing more than a so-called State’s way of standardising the population according to a dominant ideological or propagandist position that maintains the power status quo. It also identifies those who are more likely to conform to the requirements of the so-called State, and those likely to ’cause trouble’ by thinking independently intellectually, and critically…that is, differently. As one senior Church official put it in the formative years of the development of a ‘national school system’ in Australia, what was needed was an education that taught the ‘lower classes’ sufficient to enable them to obey rules and regulations but not enough to enable them to challenge the established authority. Based on an understanding of knowledge as the sum of one’s sociocultural memory, itself predicated on firsthand experience in addition to a huge faith-based portion of that memory, it follows that compulsory schooling teaches not so much how to think, as what to think. We take on faith all the history, geography, language learning, social studies, civic studies, and so on, because we do not have firsthand experience of these things. Thus, it follows that we are told what to think, albeit in sometimes creative ways. The so-called State acts to standardise what we think because, by standardising it, it is able to stratify society and preserve its power and status in a sort of divide and conquer sense.

My wife and I ‘made our children’. We chose to bring them into existence. Our children do not ‘belong’ to us. Nor do they ‘belong’ to the so-called State. What makes the so-called State think, suddenly, when my children are four years old, that it is best placed to know my children and their wants and needs better than I, or indeed better than the children do? What authorises the so-called State to choose the form of society in which my children have to live? Why can my children not decide on the society they want when they are capable of deciding? The society the so-called State thinks is best for my children is one in which they have been propagandised to believe in the authority of the so-called State, in the correctness of the so-called State, and in the boundaries set by the so-called State. In other words, compulsory school not only denies me the right to co-construct a peaceful and relevant society with my children. It also teaches my children to be laboratory rats within a cage, free to choose to run on the treadmill, or drink from the water dispenser, or sleep when it suits them, or run up and down the ladder…but always within the confines of the so-called ‘State’s’ cage. This is not freedom, and compulsory schooling does not prepare anyone for a life of freedom based on the idea of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, or the principle of doing no harm to others.

As ever, I encourage your contributions to this thinking. I welcome comments and constructive criticism of the ideas presented here.

Kindest Regards,

Peter

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The Idea of Sound-Shapes

In this blog, I want to discuss the idea of sound-shapes. Sound-shapes relate to the idea of language-as-code, and are the code by which we become aware of our environment. The importance of this idea underpins the evolving discussion of the learning-teaching relationship and how the entirely artificial learning-teaching environment of school has failed until now.

The idea of language-as-code is not new. Basil Bernstein (1970) [1] writes:

The concept of socio-linguistic code points to the social structuring of meanings and to their diverse but related contextual realizations. A careful reading of the papers always shows the emphasis given to the form of the social relationship, that is the structuring of relevant meanings. Indeed, role is defined as a complex coding activity controlling the creation and organization of specific meanings and the conditions for their transmission and reception (italics in original).

In the context of the idea of sound-shapes, there are several points to note in what Bernstein writes. The first is that he refers to “socio-linguistic code”. I draw on the idea of language-as-code in describing the idea of sound-shapes.

The second point is that Bernstein refers to “the social structuring of meanings”. This is an important point because it can be used to demonstrate that when speaker or writer, and listener or reader, do not share the same language-as-code, meaning is typically problematic. The idea of sound-shapes addresses the problematic nature of an unshared code, and goes to the heart of the failure of schooling.

The third point to note in what Bernstein writes is that he refers to “the form of the social relationship”. The form of the social relationship is central to how and why the learning-teaching relationship matters, and to whom. The failure of schooling may be attributable to choices made about the form of the social relationship at schools and in the broader community. Thus, the idea of the form of the social relationship is included here.

Next, Bernstein refers to “a complex coding activity controlling the creation and organization of specific meanings”. Again, coding and its relationship to meaning are central ideas in this blog.

Finally, Bernstein writes about the “conditions for their [meanings’] transmission and reception”. On this point, I differ from Bernstein because of evidence of the highly problematic nature of meaning in the social context of people who do not share the same language-as-code.

The next matter to address is that of the role of gestures (including so-called body language) in the socio-linguistic context of sound-shapes. Simply, gestures and body language (as well as the various non-Western written forms of languages) are included in the ‘shapes’ part of sound-shapes. Voice, and its many permutations, is included in the ‘sound’ part.

Socio-linguistic code is a summation of the socio-linguistic aspects of the learning-teaching relationship, including the complexity inherent in the question of how and why it matters, and to whom. When people share a language code, meaning may be constructed from the sound-shapes they encounter in their experience of life. When they do not share the same language code, meaning is highly problematic. What can be considered as a result of this is that meaning may not be able of transmission. Rather, it may be a constructed reality in the mind of someone who shares not only the same language-as-code but also a similar sociocultural experience.

The sharing of a similar sociocultural experience is important in the interpretation of the sound-shapes in a relevant way. Bernstein writes about the “conditions for their [meanings’] transmission and reception”, but I argue that meaning cannot be transmitted. Instead, what is transmitted is a socio-linguistic code of sound-shapes that can be used to construct meaning, but only if the recipient of the sound-shapes shares the same language-as-code, and a similar sociocultural experience as the source of the code—a book, a speaker, a signpost, a newspaper, and so on.

Evidence for this can be encountered in the idea of the sound-shapes 猫 or ねこ. To someone who shares the language-as-code of the Japanese, the meaning of these two sound-shapes may be constructed immediately and readily, albeit inclusive of some vagaries explained below. To those who do not, it is mysterious, and no meaning can be constructed, other than perhaps a meaning approximating ‘I do not understand this language’. From these two sound-shapes, however, similar meaning can be interpreted by someone who shares the code. To a person whose sociocultural and socio-linguistic experiences are in the English language-as-code, the relevant sound-shape necessary to invoke a socioculturally relevant meaning in the mind of the recipient of the code is the ‘word’ cat. To someone who shares the language-as-code of those of us who speak English and who can draw on sociocultural and socio-linguistic experiences to enable us to construct meaning on the basis of the sound-shape ‘cat’, we immediately ‘know’ what we are thinking about.

Interestingly, though, if we take a minute to consider an aspect of the meaning invoked, we might discover that the meaning to you is a tabby cat; while the meaning to me is a so-called Siamese cat. This is a useful finding because it reveals that meaning is not transmitted but constructed in the mind of the recipient of the code, and that the recipient’s sociocultural and socio-linguistic experiences bear heavily on the interpretation of the code to construct relevant meaning. What follows from this is Bernstein’s idea that meaning is socially structured.

The social structuring of meaning is, however, necessarily something that occurs in the socioculturally-attuned mind of the recipient of the relevant code. When meaning is constructed on receipt of the relevant code, but not clearly, the recipient may ask for clarification—‘do you mean…?’ Interestingly, this socio-linguistic tool implies that meaning is intended by the sender of the sound-shapes. While there is intuitively an implied meaning in the mind of the transmitter of the sound-shapes, one predicated on the transmitter’s sociocultural experiences of life, there is no guarantee the intended meaning will be constructed in exactly the same way in the mind of the recipient of the code. Misunderstanding can often arise because of lack of clarity in the sound-shapes selected for transmission, or because both share similar (but sufficiently different) experiences. The relevance of this to the assertion of the failure of schooling relates to the idea that schooling in schools (as opposed to home schooling, an equally insidious idea because the taxation attributed to schooling in schools is not returned to those who choose to home school) alters the sociocultural and socio-linguistic experiences of those compelled to attend, and not necessarily in ways that complement the interests of the individuals who attend.

In a later blog, I will argue that a large proportion of the disinterest in schooling these days, and perhaps even historically, derives from incongruent assumptions about how and why the learning-teaching relationship matters, and to whom. As in a marriage, or indeed any other form of human relationship—the entire human experience, I will argue, unfolds in a learning-teaching relationship—when the assumptions of those who relate in this way are congruent, the relationship is likely to endure. When their assumptions about how and why the relationship matters begin to differ, one or the other, or both, may begin to withdraw from the relationship. When the assumptions are significantly different enough, one or other may choose to leave the relationship. I will argue later that leaving the learning-teaching relationship that schooling compels us to participate in, may be nothing more than a reflection of incongruent assumptions about how and why that particular construction of the learning-teaching relationship matters, and to whom.

For now, however, I turn back to Bernstein’s “form of the social relationship”. The form of the social relationship is a central pillar in the thesis that emerges from these blogs—that we do not have sufficient socioculturally or socio-linguistically shared assumptions about the learning-teaching relationship to enable us to act responsibly in relation to the compulsion to schooling. Thus, we act typically independently of each other to impose our sociocultural and socio-linguistic assumptions, experiences, and desires on others, largely to reproduce a society in which we are more or less comfortable, but which may or may not be relevant to the next generation. We reproduce ourselves in the idea of schooling, and for the most part do so without formal consent. To top off what is a rather tasteless cake, whichever way you slice it…we are compelled by taxation to pay for schooling, and have little or no say in the curriculum we are compelled to endure. Is it any wonder we encounter incongruent assumptions about how and why the learning-teaching relationship matters, and to whom?

In the context of the social relationship referred to by Bernstein, a key part of the emerging discussion will be the idea of consent. Why is it that we wake up one day and go to a school, without apparently considering what that institution is or what it represents? I venture to suggest that a moment’s introspection will reveal that very few if any of us have ever formally consented to be compelled to be schooled, much less to the idea of enduring the random collation of ideas by a remote body of ordinary citizens, which forms the focus of twelve or so years at the front end of life when we have no experience against which to test any underlying assumptions about the relevance of the ideas. It’s only when we become teenagers that we are enabled by an emerging arrogance to challenge the underlying assumptions, and, in many cases, find them insubstantial or less relevant than we had been led to believe.

The role of a mythical, so-called, State is prominent in the reproduction of ‘self’, and I will argue that people who do not know my child have no place compelling it to study a random curriculum to achieve a social status it may or may not wish to achieve, much less one for which, as its parent, I ought to take full responsibility. As an ordinary citizen, I do not have the right to compel a neighbour’s child to endure my curriculum. Where does that right spring from? How can our elected representatives exercise a right they do not have as ordinary citizens? The authoritarian, non-consensual nature of the assumption of such authority draws the balance of power between the people and the so-called ‘State’ into question, in my view. School—in its current form—is an institution well past its use-by date, and even less relevant tomorrow than today. The failure of the compulsory schooling idea will be revealed in a later blog, in which I argue that we are on the cusp of a significant evolutionary stage and have a chance to expose the possibilities that make up the potential futures of our species.

Bernstein refers to “a complex coding activity controlling the creation and organization of specific meanings”. I will show that the complex coding activity is socioculturally unique and that our understanding of learning and teaching are, as a result, poor. That is not to say that we are incapable of comprehending a better experience of life. Rather it is to argue that we are poorly equipped by a self-interested ‘State’ to challenge the underlying assumptions on which it builds it power base. Here again, I hold the compulsion to schooling culpable. I will show that schooling does not prepare anyone for life; but rather for a life of servitude to an ideological context—largely economic—constructed by the ‘State’. Against this backdrop, I will discuss the idea of manufactured consent, and the use of propaganda to shape the lives we are compelled to lead. If you thought there was no such thing as a conspiracy, hold onto your hat. Literacy and numeracy are at the heart of our ability to rise against assumptions and ideas inimical to our choice of life. I address both literacy and numeracy as the foundation of a new learning-teaching relationship that empowers the people, not the ‘State’.

Regarding the transmission and reception of meaning, I will show that meaning is not transmitted. Nor is it received. I will argue, instead, that it is constructed as a socio-linguistically and socioculturally sensitive response to sound-shapes encountered in our environment. Here, again, I will address the role of the so-called ‘State’ in managing the environment in such a way as to preserve something that may or may not be a choice of those directly affected by ‘State’ intervention in their environment. The role of schooling in propagandizing the environment reveals schools to be entirely artificial environments constructed for specific purposes, and not necessarily those of the people whose consent is absent from a form of social contract that engages them in compulsory schooling.

In conclusion, in this blog I set out to say something about the idea of sound-shapes. Sound-shapes are the code by which we become aware of our environment. Language is the code we use to convey sound-shapes that may be used by a recipient to construct socioculturally and socio-linguistically relevant meaning, provided that the recipient shares an understanding of the code. If the recipient of sound-shapes does not share the code or have relevant sociocultural or socio-linguistic experience, meaning can be highly problematic. Bernstein argues that meaning is both transmissible and receivable. I argue it is not. The implication of this conclusion bears on the ensuing discussion of the learning-teaching relationship, and of perceptions of how and why it matters, and to whom.

Using ‘sound-shapes’ to discuss the learning-teaching relationship enables us to enter the sociolinguistic and sociocultural worlds of those who use different language codes; those who use alphabets; those who use pictographs and syllabaries; those who use no written form; those who use sign-languages, and various scripts, including Sanskrit, and so on.  Sound-shapes keeps us focused on the idea that these are merely signs and signifiers. They carry no meaning (including phatic communion meanings derived from socio-linguistic considerations). This is an important note because it enables us to isolate learning as something unique to the individual concerned, and almost surely dependent on context, including sociocultural and socio-linguistic contexts. Such a claim lays bare the fragility of an imposed testing regime designed to test not what has been learnt but what has been taught.

From this flows the claim that the idea expressed in English by the sound-shape ‘teaching’ is universal across all cultures of the world. However, what teachers do is not universal. It is culturally relative. Teachers in Somalia do not do the same things as teachers in America. Teachers in France do not do the same things as teachers in Tibet. Something culturally relative is not, by definition, universal. This means that what teachers do is not expressed by the idea ‘teaching’. So we need to consider a number of alternative ideas in order to bring the learning-teaching relationship into sharper focus. We will do that in another blog.

Please feel free to comment on any of what you have read. These blogs are a summation of opinions only. I am sufficiently enamoured of learning to respond favourably to persuasive argument, which probably says something about how and why manufactured consent is such an insidious aspect of the relationship between the governors and the governed in this day and age.

Best Wishes

Peter

[1] B. Bernstein, from Class, Codes and Control vol. 1: Theoretical Studies Towards a Sociology of Language, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970; in Language and Social Context, Pier Paolo Giglioli (Ed), Penguin Books, Australia, 1980